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hroughout history, the relations between Jordan and Syria have been
marked by varying degrees of mutual hostility and even violence. The
2011 uprising in Syria has affected and continues to affect the Jordanian
Syrian relation. In one hand Jordan does not have the military strength or
the political capital to show its ‘muscles’ like Turkey but on the other
hand, Jordan is a vital country considering the border comes under fire
more than others, because of its vicinity to the conflict. Although separate
entities, by sharing 400 kilometers of border, Syria project many effects on
Jordan: this blurs the clear division between foreign and domestic policy
that Jordan adopts.
Since the uprising in Syria, Jordan has taken a neutral side in this mat-
ter, and tried to remain diplomatic, and distance itself as much as possible
of what is going on in Syria considering it an internal affair, Jordan did not
evict the Syrian ambassador unlike many Arab states that did so, despite
the indirect threats every now and then to expand and move the conflict to
the Jordanian territories.
Jordan maintained a neutral position since the uprising considering it
a Syrian internal affair that it should not interfere in it.
Syria is Jordan’s gate of import from Europe, and a vital water re-
source, which Jordan has a serious lack of.
It is in Jordan’s best interest to end the Syrian crisis peacefully, and it
does not matter to it if Al Assad regime’s takes over control, or a peaceful
transition of the regime, although Jordan is leaning towards the first solu-
tion, as the new regime mean a new era of diplomatic relations between
the two countries.
In order to understand the Jordanian diplomacy towards Syria, one
must realize the different proximities that controls this diplomacy whether
internal or external and to be aware of the historical background of Syrian
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– Jordanian relations. This research paper aims to examine these
proximities to understand the diplomacy Jordan adopted yet and to which
extent it might affects Jordan future diplomacy towards Syria.
Jordan has taken in Syrian refugees since the beginning of the uprising
in Daraa, in southern Syria, where the crisis started by clashes between the
Syrian protesters and the regime’s forces in March 2011, the city is barely
six kilometers from the Jordanian border, and it shares familial and tribal
links with the neighboring Jordanian Houran region.
The refugees issue Jordan’s strife between selflessness, and State inter-
ests the refugees in Jordan topped 200,000 by the end of 2012 along with
an estimated number of 80,000 refugees living illegally in the kingdom,
the Jordanian government halted rents for those who bypassed check-
points. Jordan’s cautious approach is due to a rooted sense of distrust. The
waves of Palestinian refugees in 1948 and 1967 taught the country that
a ‘temporary’ solution might in fact turn out a permanent one. Neverthe-
less Jordan opted for an ‘open border’ policy contrary as a humanitarian
role toward the crisis, like it did with the Iraqi refugees after the American
invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Liuni, 2012).
Most of Syrian refugees’ problems in Jordan are the loss of education
except in refugees’ camps where there are schools for children for basic
learning, but those who fled Syria without proofs of their certificates or
their educational backgrounds are facing a hard time enrolling in Jordan
educational institutes.
With the number of refugees increase every day in Jordan, refugees liv-
ing in camps face difficult situation as they have exceeded the Jordanian
government and the international organizations abilities to ensure full
medical services for all refugees (El-Khatib, 2013). Outside the camps
face different, and could be more difficult challenges, especially those
who live illegally in the kingdom, as they have to pay cash for medical ser-
vices.
Most Syrian refugees cannot work legally, despite the fact that many
of them are actually working in labor jobs like construction or on farms,
as the employers give them less money than Jordanians, but those refu-
gees have to adapt and live in fear of getting caught by police, just like
many Egyptians who work in Jordan without permits (Laub, Daragh-
meh, 2013).
This research paper is devoted to examine the Jordanian-Syrian bilat-
eral relations, and Jordan diplomatic position towards the Syrian uprising
of 2011, from the beginning until the end of 2013, and the importance of
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Syria’s stabilization to Jordan, considering it one of the most vital coun-
tries in the region for Jordan in the economical, social, and most impor-
tantly the geographical side, and to examine the ability of Jordan to
continue its humanitarian role toward the crisis, and most importantly how
far can this poor-resourced country take the situation of refugees if the vio-
lence in Syria continues.
Jordanian citizens are provoked and feel threatened by the rising num-
ber of Syrian refugees, complaining that the Syrian are sucking up the
kingdom’s poor resources economically, socially, and of course employ-
ments, because employers would rather hire a Syrian than a Jordanian
considering the Syrians cheap and easy labor.
Historical Background
Jordan and Syria had strong ties and ancient roots in history as Jordan
was the southern part of Syria, after the Arab Revolt in 1916, the Syrian
Arab Kingdom was the first country to declare independence of the Otto-
man Empire after the end of the First World War. The kingdom was ruled
by prince Faisal Bin Al Hussein “son of Al Sharif Hussein Bin Ali, and
brother of Prince Abdullah the first, the great grandfather of the current
king of Jordan, King Abdullah II” between 1918–1920 and then as king
after the Declaration of Independence on March 8, 1920. King Faisal was
exiled on July 1920, and the kingdom was solved into republic, after three
days of battle of Maysaloon and the occupation of the Syrian kingdom’s
capital. Syria remained under the French Mandate until along with Leba-
non until its independence in 1930 (Al-Fawwaz, Al-Abdallat, Al-Afif.,
2012).
The two countries fought together in 1948, 1967, and 1972 wars
against Israel. The worst period of relations between the two countries was
in 1970 during what is known as the “Black September”, when Syria sup-
ported all resistance Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerillas
against Israel occupation from Jordan lands and not from Syrian lands
which formed an actual increase in resistance, and it expanded in main cit-
ies of Jordan, which formed internal concern and disturbance source for
Jordan after several Israeli attack on the Jordanian cities and bearing
Jordan responsibility of the guerillas within its lands, in order to protect its
legitimate authority by taking control of the security situation, and recov-
ering the stability in the country, and ending the stated of dual power in
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Jordan. Jordanian forces managed to defeat the guerrillas and get them out
of Jordan lands to Syria and Lebanon (Al-Fawwaz, Al-Abdallat, Al-Afif.,
2012).
The Syrian government took a decision to close the Jordanian-Syrian
border, which thickened the plot diplomatically between the two coun-
tries; Syria also closed its airspace in front of the Jordanian air navigation.
This was followed by Syria’s decision to mobilize troops on the border of
Jordan, where armed clashes took place between the military forces of the
two countries.
The deportation of the guerrillas to Syria disturbed the Syrian govern-
ment, and put it in a hard situation, as it was Syria who called for freedom
for the guerillas’ actions in Jordan, and when bases of the guerillas in-
creased on Jordanian territories. The Syrian government was afraid that
the guerrillas’ operations which were released from Syria might lead to
a confrontation with Israel which Syria was not ready for at that time
(Al-Fawwaz, Al-Abdallat, Al-Afif., 2012).
Jordan wanted to improve the relations with the Syrian government
and to open the border again to the monument of transport of Jordan in the
service of nationalism battle and because the closure of border with reach-
ing settlement between government of Jordan and Palestinian resistance
movement, leading to establishment of new bases for guerrillas on the Jor-
danian territories. Closing border went on about 489 days; Syria decided to
re-open the border in 1973 to decrease the economic burdens in one hand
and to face the Israeli enemy on the other hand (Brulliard, Warrick, 2012).
During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, which was initiated by Syria and
Egypt against Israel, Israel troops went deep into Syrian territories; Jordan
sent part of its military troops to the Syrian front, which helped in improv-
ing the relation between the two countries (Al-Daajeh, 2012).
Jordan’s relations with Syria also improved as Jordan became increas-
ingly disenchanted with its relations with the United States. Since the
early 1970s, Jordan had negotiated for the purchase of a US$540 million
air defense system from the United States to be financed by Saudi Arabia.
When the United States Congress objected to the arms sale, King Hussein
commented that relations with his one-time sponsor had reached “a sad
crossroads.” In 1976, with Syrian encouragement, he traveled to Moscow
to sound out the Soviet Union on its willingness to provide a similar sys-
tem. In the face of persuasive American and Saudi lobbying, King Hussein
eventually opted to purchase the American Improved Hawk air defense
system (Nasur, 2012).
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In 1980s Syria accused Jordan of harboring members of the Muslim
Brotherhood, who had escaped from Syria. This charge led to new tension
between the two countries in December 1980, with military forces of both
sides deployed along the border. As a counterweight to Syria, Jordan im-
proved its relations with Iraq, and became one of its primary suppliers. In
1981, Jordan accused Syria of being behind the kidnapping of a Jordanian
military officer in Beirut, and charged Riffat Al-Assad, former president
Hafiz Al-Assad’s brother, with masterminding a plot to assassinate the
Jordanian prime minister. By the mid-1980s, rapprochement efforts were
again underway (Nasur, 2012).
After the 1991 Gulf War relations between Jordan and Syria improved.
When King Hussein died in 1999, Jordan and Syria never really recon-
ciled. However, the Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement may have begun
when the former president Hafiz Al-Assad participated in the late king
Hussein’s funeral on February 1999, Two months later that year the newly
appointed king of Jordan, king Hussein’s elder son, king Abdullah II said
that Jordan’s relations with Syria is proceeding for the better (Al-Daajeh,
2012).
To strengthen the ties between the two states, in April 1999 the king
Abdullah II visited Syria to discuss with Syrian president the bilateral rela-
tions between the two countries and the ways to strengthen those relations
as well as regional developments. The two leaders agreed on the impor-
tance of maintaining close cooperation between their countries in all
fields.
President Hafiz Al-Assad passed away in 2000 passing power to his
son Bashar Al-Assad and despite what seemed a blur in the relations be-
tween Jordan and Syria, with both countries under new leaderships, the
rapprochement between them was fully underway.
There are three main factors that should be taken under consideration
regarding the Jordanian-Syrian bilateral relations.
1. The Geographical Factor
The Jordanian-Syrian boundary is 233 miles in length and is delimited.
Beginning in the Yarmuk River (Nahr al-Yarmuk) above Al-Hammah, the
boundary follows eastward primarily in the river and its tributaries, Wadi
Zayzun and Wadi Maydan, a distance of about 24 miles where it leaves the
river. The boundary then trends southeastward a distance of about 80 miles
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to a point 1.99 miles (3 kilometers, 200 meters) north of the summit of Tall
Rimah (Tall Rumah) at which point the boundary turns northeastward in
a straight line for a distance of about 129 miles to the Iraqi tripoint at ap-
proximately 33° 22’ 29” North Latitude and 38° 47’ 33” East Longitude
(Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1969, p. 2).
The geographical boundary has always played a major role in shaping
Jordan diplomacy towards Syria, as it is essentially artificial, and a result
of a division of British and French spheres of influence following Allied
defeat of Ottoman Turkey in World War I. The delineation was later con-
firmed by the League of Nations. There are no active disputes between
Jordan and Syria regarding the specific alignment of the boundary.
Grazing and watering practice traditionally conducted by tribes crossing
the boundary remain undisturbed.
The georaphical approximity plays a great role in making Jordan the
country with the largest refugees number since the uprising started in
Daraa, and because many Jordanian people bear strong social relations
with the Syrian people, especially those living in southern Syria (Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, 1969, p. 2).
In addition, many Jordanian people bear strong social relations with
the Syrian people, especially those living in southern Syria. Most northern
Jordanian families have cousins and relatives in Syria, and vice versa. Jor-
dan is considered an essential part of the Levant as it is a natural, geo-
graphic extension of Syrian terrain. This was born of a network of
relations and complicated overlapping between the two countries. In the
event of a threat, Syria is an essential component of Jordanian defense, and
vice versa (Al-Daajeh, 2012).
Most northern Jordanian families have cousins and relatives in Syria,
and vice versa. For example, the Al-Zoubai and Al-Shari’a families are
very large and found split between northern Jordan and southern Syria
(Al-Daajeh, 2012).
2. The Economical Factor
As Al-Khori points out in his article economic links between Jordan
and Syria are extensive. It could be the most important approxemity as
Jordan almost has no door for imports except in Al-Aqaba port (A far
port city in southern Jordan) and it has no use for Jordan when it comes
for importing goods from Syria and European countries. Despite some
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political differences during the 1980s and the 1990s between the two
countries, nobody can deny the importance of the Syrian border to Jor-
dan, and how important to Jordan to keep this border under the control of
the Syrian regime. However, with the new leadership in both countries,
a rapprochement came about at various levels, including the economic
one. The more relaxed ties began to bear fruit in mid-1999, after king
Abdullah II came in rule and the two countries signed several economic
agreements, including a major tariff cut to spur merchandise trade
(Al-Khouri, 2001).
In both countries, economical weakness has been instrumental in spur-
ring moves towards stronger regional and international ties. Jordan, in the
second half of the 1990s, suffered from a weak economy and GDP growth
barely averaged 3%. Trade between Jordan and Syria is small compared to
either country’s commerce with its lead. Jordan has welcomed trade or
other economic overtures from neighboring and other countries, as a basic
tenet of the IMF-led structural adjustment program, which is opening up
the economy to outside business (Al-Khouri, 2001).
In his article The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Syrian Cri-
sis, Al-Daajeh agrees with Al-Khori considering Syria Jordan’s eco-
nomic most valued gateway to Europe because most European products
enters Jordan though Turkey and then Syria, connecting Jordan’s market
to Syria through a network of land passages. Similarly, Jordan and Syria
have a number of trade agreements and, consequently, the majority of
goods consumed by Jordanians are from Syria. Likewise, Jordanian
products for export are marketed and transported through Syria
(Al-Daajeh, 2012).
3. The Water Factor
The water factor plays a great role in Jordan and Syria relations, unlike
its southern neighbor, Jordan have always suffered from shortage of water
resources, because much of Jordan River flow are diverted by Israel and
much of Yarmouk River are diverted by Syria, which leaves Jordan with
a small share of the two rivers.
Just a few hundred of meters separate the arid terrain in northern Jor-
dan and Syria’s fertile fields stretching across the border between the two
countries. Jordan made many agreements with Syria regarding Syria’s
providing Jordan with its needs of water supplies.
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The largest projects to supply Jordan with water were a joint Jordanian
Syrian endeavor to build a 100-meter-high dam on the Yarmuk River. The
project, which had been contemplated since the 1950s but had foundered
repeatedly because of political disputes (Al-Shami, 2013).
In 1953 Jordan and Syria reached an agreement to share the waters of
Yarmouk River as a part of a regional plan developed between the two
countries, which was modified in 1975 and again later in 1987, but that
those three agreements have not been preceded until today (Al-Shami,
2013).
In 1988 after the thaw in Jordanian-Syrian relations and appeared to be
progressing in early 1989. Called the Maqarin Dam in previous develop-
ment plans, it was renamed to Al-Wahdah Dam in order to reflect the polit-
ical rapprochement that made construction feasible. Al-Wahdah which
means “unity” in Arabic is where the dam took its name as Jordan and
Syria decided to open a new page with unity between the two countries.
The dam was to create a reservoir of 250 million cubic meters. The Jor-
danian estimate of the cost, which Jordan was to bear alone, was
US$397 million. Independent estimates placed the figure at more than
US$500 million. Building time was estimated at two years after the
planned 1989 starting date, but new political problems threatened to stall
construction. The United States attempted to mediate between Jordan and
Israel, which feared the dam would limit its own potential water supply;
Syria, however, refused to join any tripartite negotiations (Al-Fawwaz,
Al-Abdallat, Al-Afif., 2012).
In the late 1990s, after the two countries reached a settlement followed
a period of relative improvement in diplomatic relations. And Jordan was
able to build a Al-Wahdah dam on the banks of the Yarmouk River, to sup-
ply Amman with 50 million cubic meters of water and pumping 30 million
cubic meters of water for irrigation in the Jordan Valley, on the grounds
that Damascus will stick to its commitments. Construction of the dam was
funded by a loan from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Develop-
ment. After the cost amounted to $ 95 million construction of the dam
work was completed in 2006, and reached a capacity of 110 million cubic
meters (Al-Shami, 2013).
It is feared that Syrians taking shelter in Jordan in particular might face
a major problem regarding water, especially in the forthcoming summer
months. In terms of the amount of water there is per capita in the Middle
East and in the world, Jordan and Palestine are two of the poorest coun-
tries. Along with the dry spell prevailing in the area for the last decade,
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water shortages have become worse in Jordan and agricultural activities
have also been negatively affected in the country.
The existing water problem has become even more evident upon the ar-
rival refugees in the country. Jordan has been meeting its water needs from
ground waters for many years due to the lack of surface waters. According
to the British aid organization Oxfam, the population has increased as a re-
sult of the immigration from Syria. This situation has led to some wells dry-
ing up. According to another report published by Oxfam, 65 percent of
water transported to Mafraq province is lost through the pipelines and as
a result of people illegally tapping into the pipelines. Furthermore, it is men-
tioned in the reports that there are also problems in terms of the quality of
water. The quality problem leads to water-related diseases and an additional
cost for its filtration. Those who live in refugee camps cannot afford the cost
of water filtration. As a general solution, chlorine is added to waters in tank-
ers, which the World Health Organization (WHO) permits, but the fact is
that that water can create other hygiene problems if it is kept in old tankers
and not consumed within a short time of period (Maden, 2013).
Jordanian Diplomacy towards the 2011 Syrian Crisis
Since the beginning of the crisis in 2011, Jordan has taken a moderate
neutral position, and maintained that position according to constant state-
ments of the Jordanian ministry of foreign affairs, on the Syrian crisis for
neither supporting the regime nor the armed revolution, considering it
a Syrian interior affair that it has no role in it except the humanitarian role
of sheltering the Syrian refugees fleeing out to Jordan.
Except for the military fire exchange between the two countries forces
that happens every now and then on the border, which the Jordanian mili-
tary claims that they are only for providing secure converge for the refu-
gees chased by the Syrian military, no actual clashes took place between
the two countries’ military troops.
In 2012, relations became somewhat strained due to the uprising in
Syria, when Syrian people infected with the spirit of freedom large scale
protests in Syria began on March 15th.
Citizens took to the streets to protest the lack of political freedom, gov-
ernment corruption, and the continued existence of the emergency law.
Al-Assad’s regime arrested protestors in the streets on charges ranging
from sedition to treason (Al-Daajeh, 2012).
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Protests continued in the following weeks, spreading to more cities
with participants numbering in the thousands. The Syrian government has
gone so far as to send the military into cities of known protestors, and there
were many reports of Jordanian forces clashing with Syrian forces as they
fired upon refugees attempting to enter Jordan (Al-Daajeh, 2012).
The 2011 Syrian crisis is considered a main security challenge for the
development of the Jordanian internal situation, under the refuge of large
numbers of Syrians to Jordan; following the living conditions and difficul-
ties caused by the civil war in Syria.
Jordan is one of the most affected countries in the region by the events
in Syria with the humanitarian role it plays, because of the geographical
proximity which makes it difficult for Jordan to close its border in front of
the daily growing number of refugees, but if the Syrian situation continues
in this way without any actual resolutions I think there will be no choice
for Jordan except for stop or limit the number of refugees on its territories
as a reflection of their social and economical burdens before the situation
becomes a permanent problem to Jordan.
However, Jordan must control the flow of refugees entering the coun-
try, to avoid a humanitarian crisis, and to stop building refugee camps in
the country as its limited resources, even if economically assisted by
NGOs and foreign counties financial aid, at some point will not be able
deal with the situation, and advocate for a peaceful solution, and remain
oppose to any foreign military intervention against Syria to be carried out
from its territories.
With the increasing violence in Syria, particularly on the Syrian re-
gime’s side, and at the cost of civilian lives, in addition to the increasing
activity of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) throughout the country, resulting
in a loss of government control, the risks that Jordan faces, particularly at
its northern border, have become apparent.
The number of Syrian refugees entering Jordan because of the crisis
has reached a high level by the end of 2012, a level which the Jordanian
economy could not tolerate on its own except for the international humani-
tarian organizations struggling to provide support. Even with NGOs work-
ing in refugee camps, and the financial aid assistance and support Jordan
keeps receiving from foreign countries’ governments, sooner or later Jor-
dan will not be able to host one more refugee (Liuni, 2012).
The number of Palestinian refugees in Syria is approximately 800,000,
and Syrian government are attempting to send them to Jordan, creating
a moral, humanitarian, and thus grave political crisis in Jordan. If consid-
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ered refugees, Palestinians entering Jordan create a larger problem be-
cause of the following legal rights and privileges granted to them under
this status: the right to remain in the place of refuge if they so desire and
the right to resettle in the host country, where the burden is on the state to
provide them a legal status, in addition to other rights.
The humanitarian situations in Syria transitioned on to 2013 with the
number of international nations demanding immediate action increasing
constantly. Reports from the United Nations High Commission for refu-
gees, indicated that there were as many as 4,000,000 people in need of
help within Syria, including 650,000 refugees, and two million internally
displaced persons, negatively impacting on the political and economic sit-
uations in neighboring countries (United Nations High-Commission for
Refugees, 2013). Among these countries, Jordan remains to be the most
affected by the situation, with the country dedicating more funds to the ac-
commodation of thousands of refugees. Looking at its 2013 response plan
to the Syrian crisis, the Government of Jordan has articulated and reaf-
firmed its intention and willingness to open up its borders to all refugees
from Syria.
Since the beginning of 2013, refugees from Syria are provided with
a variety of humanitarian assistance including from community-based or-
ganizations, and local NGOs, in coordination with the Jordanian Hashemite
Charity Organization (JHCO), which the Government of Jordan appointed
to this role (United Nations High-Commission for Refugees, 2013).
The vast majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan does not live in camps
but mixed in with local communities, and it is there that one can find signs
that the patience of the Jordanian people is beginning to fray (Evans,
2013).
In April, 2013, Jordan accepted a slight changing in its initial stand on
providing weaponry to Free Army fighters. The Jordanian government
agreed to lead a covert operation of providing arms to the Free Army in
Syria. The carefully organized convert involved Jordan, Turkey, Qatar,
and Saudi Arabia, with other Western governments, such as America and
France (Chulov, Black, 2013).
This change in Jordanian policy towards the crisis was a consequence
of fears over the rising powers of terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaeda in
Southern Syria which created an increasing global threat. With this strat-
egy, Jordan aimed to end the civil war in Syria before it harms its economy
or even boosts powerful terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda into its terri-
tory. However, Jordan remained careful on how to handle the situation and
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avoid retaliation from the Syrian government. It ensures this by avoiding
a straight forward bid to the Syrian leader Bashar Al-Assad, and support-
ing a push to overpower Al-Qaeda, or other terrorist groups linked to it, as
its driving force (Chulov, Black, 2013).
With the use of chemical weapons, there have been increased calls for
military action from the West, with France and The United States showing
willingness to strike. The prospects of an American led intercession into
Syria’s civil unrest were based on assertions that President Bashar Al-Assad
was responsible for use of chemical attacks against civilians in Damascus.
The Arab League and the U.K were in full support of this intervention
that was however, opposed by China and Russia in the U.N. On 29th Au-
gust, 2013, Jordan strongly condemned the idea of a military strike in
Syria, saying that any attack on its neighbor will not be carried out from
Jordanian territory (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2013).
King Abdullah II said in early 2013 that Jordanian soil will not be used
to launch an attack against its Syrian neighbor, but later that year there has
been a slight change of Jordan’s ‘neutral’ position towards the crisis when
Jordan’s Prime Minister, Abdullah Ensour, made a sort of a different state-
ment saying that Jordan would support limited military strikes if it was
confirmed that the Syrian Government used chemical weapons at that time
(British Broadcasting Corporation, 2013).
To what end can Jordan endure the Crisis’
consequences?
Despite the scarcity of financial, economical and natural resources of
the country, and the economic crisis that Jordan is going through, Jordan is
considered one of the most Arab countries that received refugees espe-
cially from Arab countries, beginning with the refuge of Palestinians in
1948 and the displacement in 1967, and then receiving hundreds of thou-
sands of Palestinians who were in Kuwait during the first Gulf war, fol-
lowing refuge Iraqis after the American occupation of Iraq and now the
Syrian refugees which their number is increasing day after day and is be-
coming an enormous pressure on the national economy of Jordan because
of the high costs incurred by Jordan to provide a dignified life for refugees,
health, education and drinking water.
Jordan has taken in millions of refugees over the years; Palestinians,
Lebanese and Iraqis. Syrians now make up more than 10 percent of the
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population in the country, which suffers from double-digit unemployment
and a record budget deficit.
Some say Jordan cannot afford to take in more Syrians; others feel for
the displaced (Laub, Daraghmeh, 2013).
Despite all these enormous challenges and the lack of enough support
from Arab countries and other countries to help Jordan advancement help-
ing the Syrian refugees, Jordan on humanitarian and nationalist grounds
still receives thousands of refugees on daily basis until Al-Zaatari camp
had no room for this huge amount of human tide with the requirements of
this increase of provide all that is needed from the refugees’ daily life re-
quirements, that the Jordanian government fails to provide it even to its
own citizens especially the ones who lives in provinces and regions far
from Amman (Hijazeen, 2012).
Now that the number of Syrians in Jordan exceeded one million, the
plot thickens and makes Jordan’s economical situation even worse that it
is. Jordanians already have problems of poverty, unemployment and high
prices, and a lot of them accuse the Syrians of stealing their jobs and mak-
ing landlords raise the prices of rents in the real estate market.
This kind of situation is similar to what Jordan went through with Iraqi
refugees in 2003, the prices of almost everything doubled, especially in
the real estate market, but the Syrian situation is even worse, because the
Iraqis came to Jordan more tourists than refugees, they had money, they
raised the real estate market, made investments in Jordan, and controlled
Amman’s stock exchange market, which somehow flourished the king-
doms economic, but reflected negatively on the poor Jordanian citizens.
According to Hamada Abu Nejmeh, the undersecretary of the Ministry
of Labor, the number of Syrians who have been involved in the Jordanian
labor market had exceeded 160,000, and the vast majority of them do not
carry work permits. He said that “a large number of Syrians have a very
negative impact, especially that we are talking about labor intervention in
Jordan without visa restrictions and procedures,” adding, “We understand
their need and their right to work, but it is unfortunate they are entering
specialties deprives Jordanians of employment opportunities.” (Al-Quds
Al-Arabi, 2013).
Abu Nejmeh warned that the continuation of this situation on the long
term will raise unemployment rates between Jordanians and adversely af-
fect Jordanian projects in the field of employment.
On the national security side in Jordan, every now and then unfortunate
events takes place inside Al-Zaatari camp, refugees make protests in the
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camp over almost everything, when the electricity goes out or the water
run out, some of them clashes with the police, while many other tries to es-
cape the camp as they claim that the living conditions are unbearable in-
side the camp. Protests also takes place in front of the Syrian embassy in
Amman, and usually clashes happens between those who is for Al-Assad’s
regime and those who are against it.
There are suspicions among Jordanians that some of the people who
comes to Jordan as refugees are actually members of Hezbollah Lebanese
party ‘which is on Al-Assad’s regime’s side’and Syrian intelligence mem-
bers, who aims to create such disturbances on purpose inside and outside
the refugee camps in Jordan in order to create discord and confusion in
Jordanian cities to drag it into the Syrian situation.
Conclusion
The total cost of hosting the Syrian refugees in Jordan has exceeded
2 billion dollars, while the financial support from the organizations and
countries to Jordan did not exceed 800 million dollars. Brigadier General
Dr. Waddah Al-Hamoud, Director of the Department of the Syrian refugee
camps in Jordan, declared on December the 5th 2013 that the total number
of Syrian refugees in Jordan has reached 571,247 refugees. Al Hamoud
added that Jordan can no longer take the pressure of the constant flow of
the refugees, which is reflecting dangerously in the kingdom’s poor re-
sources, especially the infrastructure.
Jordan’s preferred policy towards in Syria crisis has been one of caution.
Its actions indicate that the country does not wish to provoke any form of re-
taliatory attacks from Assad, and is also fearful of the potential for collapse
of the regime that could result in empowering of hostile forces such as
Al-Qaeda. Publicly, the Government of Jordan has chosen to distant itself
from the conflict in Syria, despite pressure from international allies to join the
anti-Assad movement. In addition, to show its constant support and willing-
ness to help, Jordan has continued to open its borders for refugees from Syria,
although it is likely that this will strain its precarious finances and resources.
There are altogether over one million Syrian refugees in Jordan, ac-
cording to Mohammad Al-Momani, Jordan’s minister of state for media
affairs.
That’s a lot in a country of just over six million people. The strain on
a country poor in resources has been enormous.
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“Think of the water scarcity in Jordan and how much we are enduring,
the pressure of providing water to the refugee camps,” said al-Momani. He
listed off other problems: inflation, housing and employment.
“Economically, it’s affected us very much,” said a retired policeman in
downtown Amman. “Many Syrians are taking the jobs of Jordanians.”
(Evans, 2013).
Jordan now urges a diplomatic solution to end the conflict in Syria and
a peaceful transition of power in it. For Jordan, the greatest threat is not the
Syrian army but the international community’s inaction on the Syrian tur-
moil. It is in Jordan’s best interest to forbid the Syrian regime from using
its artillery in the direction of Jordanian territories, control its border with
Syria to prevent terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda of growth in that area, as
well as to avoid being used as a pad for any foreign military action against
Syria.
The Jordanian government must take urgent steps towards the Syrian
situation, like limiting the number of Syrian refugees like Turkey did or
completely stop receiving more refugees, which will be the better solution
before it is too late if it is not already is, otherwise very soon the Jordanian
average citizen will not find a place for him in his own country.
Main Syrian Refugees Camps in Jordan
 Al-Zaatari refugees camp in Al-Mafraq.
 Al Zaatari refugee camp is the first and the largest, “considered the sec-
ond largest refugees camp in the world” (Evans, 2013) Syrian refugee
camp in Jordan; it was opened in July, 2012 in Al Mafraq city (80 kilo-
meters northern Amman).
 Since the opening of the camp, it was faced by many problems; the main
one was the population fast growth of the Syrian refugees which ex-
ceeded 140,000 refugees after one year of the camp opening, while it
was built for a maximum capacity of 60,000 refugees.
 According to the latest statistics by the end of 2013, the overall number
of the donated pre-made houses (caravans) in the camp is amounted to
approximately 3000 Caravans.
 In his latest statement, the director of Al-Zaatari camp for Syrian refu-
gees Colonel Zaher Abu Shehab declared that the camp is still under the
need of new caravans, as the camp continues to receive Syrian refugees
every day.
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 Al-Zaatari camp now has about 2000 caravans, whereas the number of
tents is around 3000 tents, the camp currently needs approximately 4000
Caravans to get rid of tents permanently and replace them with caravans.
The camp has no concrete buildings at all, except of some of the premises
of international organizations that requires protection (Hijazeen, 2012).
 Syrians in the camp make protests to get out of it or to be deported back
to Syria, clashes happens every now and then between the refugees and
the Jordanian forces in the camp.
 Mraijib Al-Fhoud refugees camp in Al-Zarqa.
 The opening of Mraijib Al-Fhoud camp was after nine months of open-
ing Al-Zaatari camp for Syrian refugees.
 The camp was built by financing of The United Arab Emirates, due the
maximum number reach in Al-Zaatari camp, at a cost of 10 million dol-
lars, and under the UAE Red Crescent administration, it is the second
official camp for Syrian refugees in Jordan. The camp contains 770 car-
avans, the camp accommodated 25,000 Syrian refugees in 2013
(Al Islah News, 2013).
 The camp was built as a typical city on 250 acres to include four schools
to accommodate 4000 Syrian students, and 14 kitchen, each with an
area of 100 square meters, and there is also a shopping center, and
a mosque with an area of 300 square meters, a water purification plant,
and children playgrounds (Al Islah News, 2013).
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Jordañska dyplomacja wobec Syrii i kryzysu syryjskiego (2011–2013)
Streszczenie
Relacje miêdzy Jordani¹ i Syri¹ na przestrzeni wieków naznaczone by³y ró¿nym
stopniem wzajemnej wrogoœci, czy nawet przemocy. Syryjskie powstanie z 2011 roku
nie pozostaje bez wp³ywu na stosunki jordañsko-syryjskie. Jordania zajê³a neutraln¹
pozycjê wobec wydarzeñ w Syrii, traktuj¹c je jako wewnêtrzn¹ sprawê s¹siada, jednak
– w przeciwieñstwie do innych arabskich pañstw – nie zamknê³a ambasady syryjskiej.
Artyku³ poœwiêcony jest relacjom jordañsko-syryjskim i stanowisku dyplomatyczne-
mu Jordanii w latach 2011–2013 wobec syryjskiego powstania 2011 roku. Omawia
równie¿ znaczenie stabilizacji sytuacji w Syrii dla Jordanii, jako ¿e Syria jest jednym
z wiêkszych pañstw regionu, w wymiarze ekonomicznym, spo³ecznym i geograficz-
nym oraz bada mo¿liwoœci udzielania przez Jordaniê pomocy humanitarnej uchodŸ-
com syryjskim.
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